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Abstract—The original design of the Internet was a resilient,
distributed system, that maybe able to route around (and
therefore recover from) massive disruption — up to and including
nuclear war. However, network routing effects and business
decisions cause traffic to often be routed through a relatively
small set of Autonomous Systems (ASes). This is not merely an
academic issue; it has practical implications — some of these
frequently appearing ASes are hosted in censorious nations.
Other than censoring their own citizens’ network access, such
ASes may inadvertently filter traffic for other foreign customer
ASes.
In this paper, we examine the extent of routing centralization
in the Internet; identify the major players who control the
“Internet backbone”; and point out how many of these are, in
fact, under the jurisdiction of censorious countries (specifically,
Russia, China, and India). Further, we show that China and
India are not only the two largest nations by number of Internet
users, but that many users in free and democratic countries are
affected by collateral damage caused due to censorship by such
countries.
I. INTRODUCTION
Open access to the Internet is an exceptionally powerful
political resource. However, several Governments — notably
China, Russia, Cuba etc. and also some notable democracies
such as India, South Africa, and Indonesia, have expressed
concern about the open Internet1. This concern may be benev-
olent, e.g., policing child pornography; but there is precedent
where state control of communication channels has been
abused to silence the opposition. In this context, it is natural
to ask how free and open the Internet is — and how robust it
is to censorship by these countries.
The Internet, as originally mandated by DARPA, was a re-
silient communication network that could survive tremendous
damage. Internet routing protocols relying on connectionless
packet switching help to route around network disruptions.
However, in the twenty-plus years that the Internet has
been operated by commercial companies, it has evolved and
changed. The Internet today consists of more than 50, 000
ASes that peer with one another through complex business
relationships (as customers, peers, or providers [2], [3]) so
1Kyrgyzstan opposes declaring access to information online as a human
right. Bangladesh, Congo, and Kenya are opposed to free speech online as
a human right. Bolivia, Burundi, China, Cuba, Ecuador, India, Indonesia,
Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, United Arab Emirates,
Venezuela, and Vietnam are opposed to both[1].
as to forward each others’ traffic2 and as a consequence
of business incentives, the Internet now has a hierarchical
structure: a few key players intercept a very large fraction
of network paths, and potentially, of Internet traffic.
This hierarchically structured Internet might not be a prob-
lem, if we are sure that the “key players” are trustworthy. And
indeed, the original 2001 study by Subramanian et al. [4] that
reported that the Internet had a backbone (and presented a
five-level hierarchy of the Internet from dense core (20 ASes)
to stub customer ASes (8852 ASes)) indicated that the “core”
ASes were major ISPs, from the US, Sweden, and France —
countries promoting free online communication. But the fact
remains that the balance of power in the Internet is shifting.
Today, a large fraction of Internet users reside in censorious
nations like India, China and Russia [5]; it stands to reason
that several key ASes also lie in these nations, and are subject
to their censorship policies.
A further concern is the recent report by Houmansadr et al.
[3] which indicates that, in practice, individuals, companies,
and even nations have very limited control over which ASes
provide their Internet routes. Even in the case of China,
the world’s largest nation by number of Internet users (720
million) [5], choosing to re-route around a very small fraction
of world ASes would lead to massive and costly disruptions.
1) About 44 ASes in China would have to start functioning
as transit ASes (China has only 30 transit ASes, so this
is an increase of 150%).
2) The effective latency seen by the Chinese user would
increase by a factor of 8.
In other words, the hierarchical structure of the Internet
may make it infeasible to perform large scale re-routing;
maintaining Internet access, while avoiding those key ASes
of the Internet which act maliciously, is not a viable option
for many users.
It is thus natural to ask to what extent the Internet routing
policies of key players impact the network access of other
ASes, particularly if such key ASes are hosted in censorious
2The existence of such relationships is a constraint on the paths traversed
by traffic. For example, if ASes A and B are both providers to AS X, then X
will refuse to carry transit traffic from A to B (or B to A).
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nations. In this regard, our paper looks into the following
research questions:
1) Where are the key ASes today, and how effective are
they at capturing Internet traffic?
The study by Subramanian et al. is fifteen years old;
in this time, the Internet has grown from 10,000 ASes
to 55,000. How many “heavy-hitter” ASes are there in
the current Internet? Are any of these likely censorious?
And how much impact can they have?
2) How much impact do censorious countries have, on
network access of other nations?
More specifically, are any “heavy-hitter” ASes located
in censorious countries also filtering paths which start
in other, nearby ASes (legally beyond the censors’
jurisdiction), but which pass through the heavy hitters?
To answer the aforementioned questions, we began by
mapping the AS-level Internet paths connecting various ASes
to popular websites. Our approach, following Gao et al. [6],
was to use publicly available BGP routes (obtained from
various Internet Exchange Points across the globe [7]), and
the relationships between the ASes [2], to construct a directed
AS-level graph of the Internet, connecting IP prefixes to all
ASes of the world.
We observed that very few ASes — 30 (viz., 0.055% of
world ASes) — consistently intercepted over 90% of the world
paths to the popular websites we chose, whether we took top-
10, top-20, ... or top-200 websites (as per Alexa). Fully one-
third of these “heavy-hitter” ASes were found to have their
official headquarters in known censorious nations like China,
India and Russia, in stark contrast to the 2001 study where
none were in censorious countries [4].
A related concern is raised by the observation that Chinese
Internet filtering policies inadvertently censor DNS traffic orig-
inating outside, but passing through, China [8]. Traffic filtering
and monitoring, by the key “heavy-hitter” ASes hosted in a
censorious nation, impacts not only “service” traffic from the
nation concerned, but “through” traffic from other nations —
a clear breach of domain. Our research findings in Section IV
reveal that collateral damage is a serious issue for every one
of the nine censorious countries we study, and most of all for
China (over 92% of all the network paths that traverse Chinese
ASes originate outside the network boundaries of China).
As an aside, we also observed that “heavy-hitter” ASes
included not only Tier-1 ASes, but a considerable number of
Tier-2 ASes, and that, conversely, several Tier-1 ASes were
not heavy hitters; this was a surprise to us, given the general
folk belief that the “core of the Internet” consists of Tier-1
ASes (discussed in Section V).
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
There are two bodies of work related to the current paper.
The first involves the study of censorship and how it is imple-
mented in various countries around the world. The second is
the study of Internet mapping, or more precisely, determining
the routes taken by Internet traffic. We discuss both of these
areas briefly in this section.
A. Internet Censorship
Government censorship of the Internet was systematically
studied by Zittrain and Edelman [9], in their seminal analysis
of filtering by the People’s Republic of China. Important
early studies were then contributed by Deibert et al. [10],
Wolfgarten [11], and Dornseif [12], who describe not only
censorship policy but also mechanism of filtering as well as
anti-censorship measures. Work in the area has since focused
on either determining exactly which content is blocked in a
given country (i.e., policy) or how such blocking is performed
(mechanism).
Several prior efforts emphasize on policy. For e.g., au-
thors have explored the censorship in single countries such
as China [13], Iran [14], Pakistan [15], etc.; Verkamp and
Gupta [16] extend this with a survey of censorship across
eleven countries. Several projects provide tools to determine
censorship policy: ConceptDoppler [17], HerdictWeb [18],
CensMon [19], and Encore [20].
Other studies, focusing on mechanism, show a steady
increase in the sophistication of both censorship and anti-
censorship, from the early work of Clayton [21] et al. (TCP
reset) and Park and Crandall [22] (HTML response filtering)
to the complex arsenal used by China to block Tor, reported by
Winter and Lindskog [23]. Our work, in particular, is strongly
influenced by two papers in this group: anonymous [8], which
raised concerns that collateral damage can be caused by the
Internet filtering in a nation, and Houmansadr et al. [3], who
describe the costs of trying to avoid a particular AS.
B. Internet Mapping
Our work draws heavily on the construction of a map of
routes in the Internet. The early work in this area, such as
by Govindan and Tangmunrunkit [24], Chang et al. [25],
and Shavitt and Shir [26], relies on discovering router-level
maps using the tool Traceroute, and then uses heuristics to
deduce ASes and their connections. However, we make use
of the algorithm by Gao [2], which directly extrapolates
AS-level paths using public BGP routing data collected by
Routeviews [7].
It is reasonable to ask why we did not employ the
Traceroute-based approach, i.e. mapping the Internet by send-
ing traceroute probes from various vantage points to IPs in
different ASes, when it has been employed by the CAIDA
Ark Project [27] and iPlane [28]. Our reason is that, while our
approach does have limitations (we are limited by the accuracy
and completeness of publicly available routing tables), an
approach based on Traceroute is even more limited — by the
network locations and availability of the (volunteer) probing
nodes; and by the accuracy of IP-to-ASN mapping. We,
therefore, chose the Gao algorithm, as being more accurate in
computing AS-level paths between any two randomly chosen
ASes.
More recently, Claffy et al. [29] and Luckie et al. [30] have
demonstrated improved methods of Internet mapping, which
are very accurate in deducing AS relationships (provider-
customer, peer-peer). We have therefore taken the relationships
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they compute, and used this information in finding routes in
the Internet with Gao’s algorithm.
III. APPROACH AND METHODS
Our primary question, in this paper, is whether a small set
of Autonomous Systems actually route all or nearly all of the
traffic in the Internet—and if so, to identify these ASes. A
high-level overview of our approach is as follows.
1) Collect BGP-level routes in the Internet, to a large
set of important targets (such as Google, Facebook,
Amazon etc.) and construct an AS-level map of the
routes connecting all ASes to these destinations.
2) Identify the “heavy-hitter” ASes on the map — those
which appear on a large fraction (nearly all) of the traces.
3) Repeat the experiment with different sets of target sites,
to check that the given heavy hitters are general, and not
an artifact of the chosen list of target sites.
It is natural to question why we do not directly map the
traffic-heavy paths of the Internet. Unfortunately, direct infor-
mation about the magnitudes of traffic flows is not publicly
available. As an approximation, we map the paths from all
ASes to the most popular websites, which account for much
of the traffic in the Internet [31]. This approach does have
vulnerabilities — it is quite possible that, for example, we
choose the Alexa top-100 websites for our study, and the
map we construct is completely different than for the top-
200 or some other equally valid set. In order to guard against
such a possibility, we perform cross-validation by repeating
the experiment with multiple target sets.
We now provide the details of our method.
A. Mapping the Internet
As discussed in the previous section, there are two principal
methods of mapping the Internet. The first method, as used by
tools such as CAIDA’s Archipelago [27], involves the active
measurement of the network using traceroute etc. Probes are
sent along various paths, and the hop-by-hop path is computed,
then abstracted to AS-level resolution. The second method
is to collect publicly-available routing information, from the
BGP announcements of ASes, and to collate these routes and
extrapolate maps of the Internet.
In this paper, we have adopted the second method. We
build an AS-level Internet map, using the paths connecting
popular websites and the various ASes of the Internet, using
the approach described by Gao et. al. [2].
The approach estimates paths from a given IP or IP-prefix
to every AS in the Internet. The inputs to the algorithm are
existing BGP RIBs; we use the BGP routing tables collected
by the RouteViews project [7] from Internet Exchange Points
(IXes), where several ASes peer and advertise their available
routes.
Paths directly obtained from RIBs are termed sure paths.
ASes on sure paths are called Base ASes. For example, in
the (hypothetical) path 2869 − 3586 − 49561 − 58556 −
9829−192.0.2.0/24, each number represents an AS. The path
originates at AS2869 and terminates at AS9829, the home AS
of the advertised prefix 192.0.2.0/24. Note that the suffixes
of sure paths are themselves also sure paths.
In addition to sure paths, the algorithm computes new
ones. This is done by extending sure paths to other ASes to
which there are no explicitly-known paths (from the prefix
concerned). The extended path must be loop-free, and must
satisfy the Valley-Free Property [2]. The process is as follows.
Our original map uses the top-100 most popular websites
(as reported by Alexa) as the target WWW destinations; we
then perform cross-validation, to check that our results are
not an artifact of these sites (as discussed in detail later in this
section).
• For each prefix, all sure paths (containing all the base
ASes) are selected. (These are simply the RIB entries
corresponding to the input prefix).
Next, these sure paths are to be inspected for possible
extension to new ASes, provided they they satisfy the
Valley Free property and have no loops.
• The algorithm searches for ASes that share valid business
relations with the current end ASes of paths. (Rather
than attempt to infer relationships, we directly used the
relationships presented by CAIDA [32].)
• One edge is chosen. It is simply assumed that this edge
extends the given sure path by one hop.
Note that we are trying to find a path from an AS to the
target prefix, and that extensions of several sure paths
might connect the chosen AS to the prefix. Hence there
is a need for tie breaking.
– The algorithm sorts the possible paths, and selects
the shortest path to the prefix.
– In case of a tie, the path with minimum uncertainty
(length of the inferred path extensions) is chosen.
– If there is still a tie, the path with the higher
frequency index (the number of times a sure path
actually appears in the RIBs) is selected.
• The frequency with which the chosen edge appears in the
RIBs, the uncertainty of the extended path, and the new
path length, are updated.
B. Identifying ASes of interest
To select ASes of interest from our map of Internet paths, we
take a greedy approach. Ranking the ASes by path frequency
(i.e., how frequently an AS appears on the paths in the graph),
we keep selecting the most-frequent ASes until we achieve a
desired level of coverage. We choose 90% coverage as our
target, i.e., we select enough ASes to give us a cover of at
least 90% of the paths in the graph.
It may be questioned here why we do not follow the
standard approach of CAIDA [33], where the “importance”
of an AS is determined by its customer-cone size (the total
number of its customers, customers of customers, etc.). In
Section V, we show that in fact customer cone size is poorly
correlated to path frequency — the actual metric of our interest
— and explain why this is so.
C. Validation
The most important question regarding our study, is how
general its results are. If for example, we find that a small set
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of “key” ASes dominate routing in the Internet, can we trust
this claim, or is it only true for routes to our sample of target
sites (Alexa top-100)?
To address this concern, we repeated our experiment for var-
ious target sets (Alexa top-10, top-20, top-30 ... top-200 sites)
to see if our results remained stable. Finally, we performed
direct cross-validation by computing “heavy-hitter” ASes from
paths to one set of sites (Alexa top-100) and checking whether
they cover over 90% of paths to a different, disjoint set (Alexa
ranks 101 to 225).
In this context, we should also consider why we did not
simply use our algorithm to plot paths from every AS to every
other AS in the world. The reason is that over 85% of the
Internet consists of eyeball ASes [3], which primarily consume
content from a small number of providers; the overwhelming
majority of computed paths in such an all-to-all map would
see almost no traffic. Our map of paths from all ASes to
important destinations, in contrast, gives a reasonable picture
of the actual paths taken by traffic.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we present our experimental results. First,
we consider the map constructed with paths to our original
sample, the Alexa top-100 test sites. We then check whether
our results remain unchanged as we vary the set of target sites
in our test.
A. Test 1 : Alexa top-100
Fig. 1. Paths to Alexa top-100 sites captured by ASes
Fig. 2. Paths to one example target site (facebook.com) captured by ASes
The most important result we observe is that the frequency
with which “heavy-hitter” ASes appear on paths is remarkably
top-heavy, not only for our entire sample of test sites (shown
in Figure 1) as an aggregate, but even for the individual sites
tested (shown in Figure 2).
The highest-ranked AS, AS3356 (Level 3 Communications),
intercepts 1, 492, 079 paths (≈ 33% of total paths).3 The next
highest, AS174 (Cogent Communications), intercepts 536, 752
more paths (not counting overlaps, i.e., paths intercepted by
both). Together, AS3356 and AS174 intercept 2, 028, 831(=
1, 492, 079+536, 752) unique IP-prefix-to-AS paths, i.e., about
45% of all the paths. Proceeding similarly, we see that the top
30 ASes by path frequency together intercept 92.4% of all
paths. The complete list is presented in Table III. It represents
the ASNs, the country where it is headquartered and their
ranks with respect to path frequency (Pfreq) and customer
cone size (Csize). As is clearly visible, nearly a third of these
key ASes lie in censorious countries. (If we include AS 6453,
Tata America which, while headquartered in the US, actually
belongs to an Indian company — exactly one-third of the 30
“key” ASes lies in a censorious country.)
As may be expected, out of the censorious countries, the
ones with backbone ASes — Russia (11.09% of world paths)
and China (7.39% of world paths), as also India (3.08% of
world paths) — cover a substantial fraction of the paths in
the Internet4 (see Table I). This is still much smaller than the
U.S. (81.82% of world paths), but overall censorious nations
control 20.73% of the paths in the Internet.
This however portrays a different picture compared to the
structure of the Internet that was presented in year 2001 [4].
Approximately 20 ASes that constituted the core of the In-
ternet, were hosted in non-censorious nations (see Table IV).
Several of these ASes are non-existent now, mostly due to
change in business partnerships. Further, newer ASes have
gained prominence due to the large fraction of users that
they transport. Our results also reflect this massive growth
of the Internet – most of the Internet users of the world now
reside in Asia; clearly several “heavy-hitter” ASes are hosted
in censorious Asian countries.
B. Cross-Validation
In order to verify the generality of our results, we repeated
our experiment for various target sets (Alexa top-10, top-20,
top-30 ... top-200 sites). In each case we found the same ASes
cover ≈ 90% of paths. Further, the key ASes computed using
the Alexa top-100, also capture over 90% of paths to the
websites ranked 101 to 225 (Figures 3 and 4). [We add in
passing that we also tested how well our “key” ASes covered
paths to the 50 most popular non-domestic websites in China,
Iran, and Pakistan; they covered > 90% of these paths as well.]
3Even this figure underestimates the influence of the company, as another
of the 30 key ASes - AS 3549, i.e., Global Crossing—belongs to Level 3.
4In comparison, other censorious nations have much less impact: Iran covers
0.69%, Saudi Arabia 0.23%, and Venezuela, Egypt and Pakistan less than
0.15% each.
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TABLE I
FRACTION OF AS LEVEL PATHS INTERCEPTED BY VARIOUS
COUNTRIES
Country Fraction of total
paths intercepted
RU 11.09%
CN 7.39%
IN 3.08%
IR 0.69%
SA 0.23%
VE 0.16%
EG 0.12%
PK 0.14%
BH 0.04%
TABLE II
CORE ASES OF THE INTERNET (AS OF 2001 [4]) AND THE
COUNTRIES WHERE THEY WERE HOSTED.
Country ASNs
US 1755, 209, 3356, 4006, 3967, 2914
2828, 7018, 3561, 1239, 8918
6453, 3549, 174, 701, 1, 2548
FR 5511
SE 1833, 4200
Fig. 3. Cum. freq.: Paths to Alexa top-100 sites captured by key ASes
Fig. 4. Cum. freq.: Paths to Alexa sites 101 - 225 captured by the same ASes
TABLE III
THE 30 “KEY” ASES, WHICH INTERCEPT MORE THAN 90% OF PATHS.
ASes headquartered in censorious nations highlighted.
ASN Country Rank (Pfreq) Rank (Csize) 
3356 US 1 1 
174 US 2 2 
2914 US 3 5 
1299 SE 4 4 
3257 DE 5 3 
6939 US 6 13 
6461 US 7 8 
6453 US 8 52 
7018 US 9 17 
10310 US 10 6 
4134* CN 11 10 
3549 US 12 79 
4837* CN 13 85 
209 US 14 19 
9002 UA 15 97 
6762* IT 16 7 
8359* RU 17 22 
2828 US 18 30 
20485* RU 19 21 
16509 US 20 9 
9498* IN 21 18 
4323 US 22 16 
3216* RU 23 99 
2497 JP 24 15 
701 US 25 12 
12956 ES 26 65 
37100 MU 27 23 
4826* AU 28 26 
12389* RU 29 67 
1335 US 30 92 
 
C. Collateral Damage
Collateral damage results when an AS filters sites, and also
causes its customers to lose access [8]. If, for e.g., China was
to censor the paths routed through our chosen key ASes, not
only would Chinese people would lose access to much of
the Internet (and certainly to most popular websites); but also
customers of Chinese ASes.
In order to estimate the number of customers that are
impacted by such censorship, we inspected the paths through
and from nine censorious countries. Figure 5 shows the
percentage of paths transiting censorious nations that originate
at foreign ASes. Similar representative fractions for eight other
censorious nations are also presented in Figure 5.
We see that in the case of China, for e.g., filtering traffic
through key ASes would impact many customers, over whom
Chinese censorship policies should have no control. 306, 874
AS paths, out of a total of 332, 742 paths involving Chinese
ASes and leading to popular destinations, i.e., 92.25% —
originate at ASes outside China.
We therefore conclude that the impact of censorship in Rus-
sia, China, and India is not limited to their citizens. This is es-
pecially alarming, considering that China (with 721, 434, 547
users) and India (with 462, 124, 989) are the largest countries
by number of Internet users, and home to roughly one-third
of the world Internet-using population; Russia (102, 258, 256
users) is the sixth-largest, and extremely well connected [5].
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Fig. 5. Ratio of collateral damage (paths filtered that the country does not have
jurisdiction over) to intentional damage (paths filtered that actually originate
in the country), expressed as a percentage.
In Table IV, we show the countries that are potentially
impacted by the censorship of China, India and Russia. The
list includes most of the major powers: the United States
(with 286, 942, 362 users), Japan (115, 111, 595), Germany
(71, 016, 605), the United Kingdom (60, 273, 385), France
(55, 860, 330), etc.
TABLE IV
COUNTRIES POTENTIALLY IMPACTED BY COLLATERAL DAMAGE DUE TO FILTERING
BY THREE CENSORIOUS NATIONS — CHINA, INDIA AND RUSSIA
Censorious No. of Countries
Country impacted
CN US, RU, IN, JP,
PH, NL, GB, LU,
DE
IN US, FR, NL, GB
RU, CN, LU, JP,
SG, IT, DE
RU US, IN, CN, JP,
NL, CH, GB
V. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
From our results in the previous section, it is clear that an
overwhelming majority of Internet traffic in our tests (well
over 90%) does in fact pass through one or more of a small
set of backbone ASes. This would imply that these ASes have
the power to set de facto censorship policy, and monitor or
filter Internet traffic worldwide.
The most important question regarding our work, is how we
can claim that this picture is true for Internet traffic in general,
and not an artifact of our methodology, i.e., that the heavy
hitters for flows to Alexa top-100 sites are also heavy hitters
for flows to any site. We have already discussed our answer
to this question in the previous sections, with a description of
our cross-validation using different sets of target sites.
In this section, we also describe our finding that the “heavy-
hitter” ASes are not necessarily the Tier-1 ASes.
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Fig. 6. Schematic AS graph. A is “root” of customer cone.
A. Heavy-Hitters vs Tier-1 ASes
One of the surprising observations of our paper is that the
“heavy-hitters” of the Internet not only form a small core,
but the size of the core is not much larger than the 20 ASes
reported by Subramanian et al., despite the dramatic growth
of the Internet in the intervening fifteen years [4].
Another, and perhaps equally surprising, fact is that the
“heavy-hitter” ASes we identify are not necessarily Tier-1
ASes (defined as those with only peering relationships, and
no providers). For example, our list includes the major Tier-
2 ASes Cogent Communications (AS 174) and Hurricane
Electric (AS 6939), as well as the ChinaNet backbone (AS
4134 and AS 4837), RosTelecom (AS 12389), Yahoo! (AS
10310) etc. which are not only Tier-2 but have Tier-2 providers
(Cogent (AS 174) is a provider to RosTelecom, nLayer
Communications (AS 4436) to the ChinaNet backbone, and
Hurricane Electric (AS 6939) to Yahoo!) We did not, however,
observe any Tier-3 ASes. On the other hand, our list does not
include five of the sixteen Tier-1 ASes, specifically Deutsche
Telekom AG (AS 3320), KPN International (AS 286), Orange
(AS 5511), Liberty Global (AS 6830), and Sprint (AS 1239).
We therefore find that the assumption that Tier-1 ASes are
the “heavy-hitters” of Internet traffic, is not quite true; there
is certainly a strong positive correlation between being Tier-1
and being a “key AS” of the Internet — by which we mean
an AS able to intercept most Internet traffic — but it is neither
necessary, nor sufficient.
Next, we observed that while many of the ASes on our
list were in fact Tier-2, they were very highly ranked by
CAIDA [33] in terms of Customer Cone size. This naturally
raised the question of whether perhaps a composite feature —
Tier-1 or large customer cone — would predict if an AS is
in fact a key AS w.r.t. intercepting Internet traffic. However,
there are counter examples for this as well, such as RETN
(AS 9002) and SOVAM (AS 3216).
We then experimentally checked whether customer cone
size is a good predictor of path frequency. Our results were
very surprising: in fact, among our key ASes, the Spearman’s
Rank Correlation Coefficient between cone size and path
frequency is only ≈ 0.2. We believe the explanation for
this result comes from the existence of non-root paths in a
customer cone, which we explain with the help of Figure 6.
The figure represents a hypothetical AS graph where node
A is the “root” AS. A has the highest customer-cone size in
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Fig. 7. Valley free paths in the cone of AS3356. Green line: network path
that traverses AS3356 to reach AS2818 directly. Red lines: network paths that
traverse the one-hop customers of AS3356, but not AS3356 itself.
this figure (6 ASes - D,B,E, F,C,G) 5. ASes B and C have
customer cones of size 2. Many valid (valley-free) paths —
such as D − B − E, D − B − C − F , D − B − C − G,
D−B−A−C−F , D−B−A−C−G, E−B−A−C−F
and E −B−A−C −G — do not pass through the root AS,
i.e., the node with the highest customer-cone size.
Our map of the Internet shows that this is indeed a common
phenomenon. For example, 34.16% of the paths to top-100
IP prefixes traverse the AS with the largest customer cone,
AS3356 (cone size = 24, 553). But nearly as many paths,
33.17%, prefer to pass through its 1-hop (immediate) cus-
tomers. For e.g., as we see in Figure 7, the traffic through
AS9002 to AS2818 (www.bbc.co.uk) does not pass through
AS3356, though it is the provider to both these ASes. Still
more paths pass through n-hop customers of root ASes (i.e.
customers of customers, and so on.) As a result, customer-
cone sizes and AS path frequencies are not well correlated.
TABLE V
FRACTION OF TRAFFIC PATHS IN A CUSTOMER CONE TRAVERSING LARGE
“ROOT” AS, VS FRACTION TRAVERSING 1-HOP CUSTOMERS INSTEAD.
ASN % of path % of path
not reaching reaching
the AS the AS
3356 34.16 33.17
174 29.05 13.13
2914 28.16 12.90
1299 36.50 8.05
3257 21.00 5.23
6939 7.46 4.40
6461 5.13 4.03
6453 26.00 3.76
7018 7.40 3.70
10310 0.07 3.52
5The customer cone consists of all the ASes that A can reach via its
customers, their customers, etc.
We conclude that path frequency is not as strongly corre-
lated with customer cone size as we expected, owing to the
considerable fraction of paths that do not transit ASes with
large cone sizes (preferring to pass through their customer
ASes instead). However, for ASes with smaller customer-
cones, we observed fewer such non-root paths (possibly be-
cause an AS in a small cone tends to have fewer peers to route
through). We may perform a more extensive analysis of such
behavior in future work.
B. Current and Future Work
The primary idea that motivates this work is to map the
Internet, and determine which entities (companies and gov-
ernments) hold the strategic “high ground” of cyberspace. We
explore a complementary research direction in another work:
• The largest nation on the Internet by users, China, is
highly censorious. India, the second-largest, is rapidly
becoming censorious as well. If in future a Great Firewall
of India is built along the same lines as the Great Firewall
of China, what might it look like, and what mechanisms
might it employ? We study this question in our submitted
paper [34].
Our results indicate that routing in the Internet is indeed
dominated by a few heavy hitters, who therefore enjoy a
surprising amount of power. However, several other players in
the current Internet economy may also be considered “central”
to the Web — the major websites themselves (especially the
ones who serve as a platform - most prominently Google and
Amazon); root DNS servers; and the major Internet Exchanges
(DE-CIX, AMS-IX, LINX, IX.br, DATA-IX and MSK-IX,
NL-IX, Equinix, etc.) The general question, “who holds the
high ground,” is thus just as complicated for cyberspace as for
the physical world. (The question is very similar to asking: is
it the player who controls oil wells who is in a strong strategic
position? Or the one with the critical ports on trade routes?)
We intend to explore this research direction in detail, in the
course of our future work.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The organic growth of the Internet has led to a structure that
concentrates substantial routing power in a small number of
ASes. Our paper experimentally validates this “folk wisdom”,
and demonstrates that it still holds true even though the
Internet has grown and expanded dramatically in the fifteen
years since it was first discovered [4]. However, the main
contribution of our paper is to draw attention to the potential
for censorship in this top-heavy structure. A third of the 30 key
ASes that form the “heavy-hitter” ASes of the Internet lie in
censorious countries (unlike what was presented in 2001 [4]),
and they cover over 20% of the Internet paths in our tests.
Moreover, from direct examination we see that censorious
countries filter (and possibly also monitor) a substantial frac-
tion of traffic from other countries.
Further, we also discover that the “key” ASes of the
Internet, who carry the overwhelming majority of traffic, are
not identical to the Tier-1 ASes (as might be expected from
the colloquial use of “Tier-1”).
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We conclude that while it is certainly understandable that
the more powerful routing companies successfully increase
their influence over time, perhaps such centralization is effec-
tively making the Internet more fragile as it leads to a small
number of “throats to choke”. We will pursue this direction
further in our future work.
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